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The German Party System(s) in 2005 – A 
Return to Volkspartei Dominance 
CHARLES LEES 
 
The article assesses the socio-structural underpinnings and systemic dynamics of the 
contemporary German party system and identifies four phenomena. These are, first, 
an increased level of fractionalisation that has made it more difficult small parties to 
assume the ‘kingmaker’ or ‘pivot’ role; second, the continued strengthening of a two-
bloc dynamic; third, the emergence and persistence of the new territorial cleavage in 
the united Germany; and finally, a skew in the party system to the left that has shifted 
the position of the median legislator. It is argued that all these changes have served to 
re-assert the dominance of the two Volksparteien and have been particularly 
advantageous to the SPD. The article concludes by arguing that the outcome of the 
2005 federal election can thus be seen as very much in keeping with these trends. 
 
 
 
2 
Introduction 
The decision by Gerhard Schröder, on the evening of Sunday 22
nd
 of May 2005, to 
call an early federal election short-circuited an electoral cycle that was due to end in 
September the following year. The immediate catalyst for Schröder’s decision was the 
SPD’s anticipated - but no less shocking – defeat in that Sunday’s Land elections in 
their heartland state of North Rhine Westphalia. There was some debate as to the 
rationale behind Schröder’s decision (and, indeed some questioned its legality, 
leading to an unsuccessful challenge in the Federal Constitutional Court). For some 
observers, Schröder’s intention was to use a highly partisan campaign 
(Lagerwahlkampf) in order to re-establish discipline within the SPD and head off a 
rebellion by the left of the party’s parliamentary Fraktion. Others argued that an early 
election was a means of preventing the emergence of a significant competitor on the 
SPD’s left flank by denying the PDS and the newly formed ‘Electoral Initiative for 
Social Justice’, or WASG, the time to merge and form a genuinely ‘national’ party. 
And there were also those commentators who argued that Schröder’s decision had 
nothing to do with such a rational calculus and that the Chancellor had either simply 
had enough and was effectively throwing in the towel, or alternatively was staking all 
on one last throw of the electoral dice. 
The ultimate outcome of Schröder’s decision is dealt with elsewhere in this 
volume and it is beyond the scope of this article to assess the strategic thinking behind 
the calling of early federal elections. This article intends to map out the strategic 
environment on the eve of the federal elections of 2005. What this article will 
demonstrate, however, is that – despite appearances to the contrary in May 2005 – the 
underlying strategic environment within which the SPD was operating was quite 
benign. It is true that, at the start of the federal election campaign, the SPD appeared 
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to be in disarray and Schröder’s CDU challenger Angela Merkel enjoyed a 
commanding lead in the opinion polls. Nevertheless it will be argued that the longer 
term structural attributes of the German party system(s) worked in favour of both 
Volksparteien – and in particular to the advantage of the SPD. 
The rest of the article is structured as follows. First, the article examines the 
underlying socio-structural drivers of the contemporary party system in an historical 
context. Second, the article charts the changing constitution of the German party 
system(s), with an emphasis on the impact of the changes of the last 25 years 
including Unification. Third, the article examines in some depth the strategic 
environment generated by party system change and assesses its potential impact on 
the fortunes of the political parties. Fourth, the article pursues the logic of the 
previous section and looks at the impact of the strategic environment on real world 
outcomes at both the federal and state levels. Finally, the article summarizes the data 
and arguments made and what it tells us about the German party system(s) in 
September 2005. 
 
The Social Base of Party Competition 
Along with electoral systems and laws, political cleavages structure political 
competition and as a result shape party systems. Nevertheless, scholarly opinion is 
divided as to how these cleavages arise in the first place. Political sociologists have 
argued that political cleavages are underpinned by more embedded social cleavages
1
, 
whilst other accounts argue that cleavages are less embedded, more contingent in 
nature, and thus more dependant on political agency
2
. This article works from the 
assumption that political agency does matter and that political conflict is contingent 
on decisions taken by elites. However, it is also clear that these lines of conflict 
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cannot be drawn down from the ether and that it is prudent to ground any account of 
the German party system(s) in its social context before focusing in more detail on 
contemporary developments and the current strategic environment in which political 
parties operate. 
The notion of social cleavages is to be found in a quite diverse and contested 
literature
3
. However, Lipset and Rokkan
4
 provide the seminal account of how 
cleavages shape party systems and party competition in advanced West European 
democracies. Lipset and Rokkan’s comparative schema works from the premise that 
similarities between countries are grounded in a common experience of mass politics, 
universal suffrage, secret ballots, and open competition for votes by parties mobilising 
around cleavages. However, Lipset and Rokkan also work from the assumption that 
West European polities diverge in quite significant ways because of nation-specific 
variables such as representation criteria, election rules, and patterns of cleavages. 
Crucially for the purposes of this chapter, Lipset and Rokkan assume that these 
specific national characteristics persist and remain manifest in the warp and weft of 
modern party-political competition. 
The Lipset-Rokkan model assumes that party competition in Europe is 
primarily driven by four types of cleavage conflict - between the centre and periphery, 
between church and state or between churches, between urban and rural interests, and 
between social classes. In Germany, as in many Western European countries, the 
dominant conflicts that have persisted over time are those of class and religion. The 
class cleavage is a ‘horizontal’ cleavage, and as such is easier to pacify than ‘vertical’ 
cleavages such as those associated with the confessional conflict
5
. Thus in Germany – 
as elsewhere – post-war prosperity and the development of welfare capitalism has 
taken the sting out of class conflict to the extent that social class alone is no longer a 
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reliable indicator of voter preferences
6
. It has also been recognised that voters are 
affected by more than one cleavage and the typical example of such ‘cross-cutting’ 
cleavages is that of class and religion, buttressed by auxiliary structures such as 
churches and trade unions. In pre-war Germany, cross-cutting class and confessional 
cleavages undermined the stability of the party system
7
 but the post-war Federal 
Republic is closer to the European norm in that the two crosscutting cleavages 
generate stability and prevent one dominant cleavage from splitting society along 
religious or class lines
8
. Thus, the German party system in 2005 was underpinned by a 
reasonably strong confessional cleavage and a weaker class cleavage that is 
conditioned by either trade union membership or confessional affiliation
9
. 
Other social variables have also had an impact upon the modern German party 
system, however. In the 1960s, Lipset and Rokkan argued that European party 
systems were ‘frozen’ at the introduction of universal male suffrage and thus reflected 
the pattern of cleavages that were manifest at that point
10
. However, in Germany – as 
in most other European democracies - the cumulative effect of embourgoisement and 
social mobility eroded traditional loyalties and by the 1970s created a political 
opportunity structure
11
 for a ‘new politics’, de-coupled from the old cleavage 
structures. The way these changes impacted upon European polities varied from 
country to country, depending on local conditions
12
. In Germany, the combined 
effects of electoral dealignment
13
 and post-materialist value orientations
14
 associated 
with the new politics were to introduce an element of unpredictability previously alien 
to the cosy political consensus of the post-war Federal Republic. And of course this 
element of unpredictability was further aggravated by Unification in 1990, which 
‘injected new uncertainty into this already fluid political environment’15. The 
cumulative impact of the social changes discussed above on (i) the constitution of the 
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party system(s), (ii) the strategic environment they generated, and (ii) the patterns of 
party political competition and co-operation that arose from them, was profound and 
far reaching. It is to these themes that the article now turns. 
 
The Constitution of the German Party System(s) 
The social developments described in the pervious section are reflected in the 
development of the German party system(s) over the post-war period. Table 1 
demonstrates how the German party system at the national level has developed over 
the period 1949-2002. The table demonstrates, first, a thirty-year period of ongoing 
party system concentration, in which the party system is dominated by the two big 
Volksparteien, and, second, two systemic junctures which have served to break down 
this dominance and shift the centre of gravity within the party system towards the 
political left. The first of these junctures takes place in 1983, with the entry of the 
Greens, and the second takes place in 1990, following Unification, with the entry of 
the PDS. 
Table 1 about here 
 
Much of the concentration of the German party system(s) over the period 1949-83 can 
be attributed to the social changes noted in the previous section. The decline in the 
salience of the confessional and, in particular, the class cleavage served to reduce 
polarisation within the party system by eroding the basis of electoral support for 
flanking parties of the right and left. However, political agency also played a part and 
over the period the two Volksparteien were reasonably successful in actively 
preventing the emergence of flanking parties. Of the two, the CDU/CSU was the most 
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successful and pursued a conscious policy of integrating the political right. It did this 
by both absorbing smaller flanking parties and at the same time defending the rights 
of ethnic Germans expelled from the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. As a 
result, since the early 1960s, no party to the right of the CDU/CSU has managed to 
garner enough votes to scale the 5 per cent hurdle to Bundestag representation. 
Up until the 1980s, the SPD had also enjoyed success in this regard. The party 
successfully survived the split that followed the Zwangsvereinigung and, by 1953, had 
successfully neutralised the KPD in West Germany
16
. However, as Table 1 
demonstrates, the German party system at the national level was reconstituted through 
two crucial historical junctures in (i) 1983, with the entry into the Bundestag of the 
environmentalist Greens; and (ii) 1990, in which the PDS – the successors to the 
ruling party in the German Democratic Republic – survived the collapse of the GDR 
and established itself in the new all-German Bundestag. 
By 2005, two strong tendencies could be identified within the German party 
system(s). First, the legacy of Unification means that German party politics was now 
subject to a strong territorial cleavage. In most of the old federal states there was what 
was effectively a two-bloc system, made up of four parties (the Greens, SPD, FDP, 
and CDU/CSU), arranged along a one-dimensional left-right continuum. By contrast, 
in most of the new federal states of the former German Democratic Republic there 
was a three-party system made up of the PDS, SPD, and CDU. Taken together, this 
means that the ‘national’ party system was made up of five parties: the PDS, Greens, 
SPD, FDP, and CDU/CSU. Second, this five-party system now had a wider 
ideological range, within which the ideological centre of gravity had shifted leftwards 
from where it had been for most of the post-war period
17
. Taken in the round, the 
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changes described in this section had a profound affect on the strategic environment 
in which political parties operated and the patterns of competition and co-operation 
that this generated. It is to the strategic environment in which political parties operate 
that the article now turns. 
 
The Strategic Environment 
The development and constitution of the German party system(s) has led to the 
creation of a nation specific set of constraints and incentives that provide the 
environment within which party elites pursue strategic action. One of the key strategic 
considerations is the degree of stability within a given party system – a factor that is 
directly related to the level of fractionalisation within it. 
The crudest measure of fractionalisation describes the total number of parties 
that exist within a party system. In theoretical terms, increased fractionalisation 
increases in turn the likelihood of ‘cycling’, by which any potentially winning actor or 
coalition can be trumped by another alternative
18
. Increased fractionalisation often 
goes with higher levels of party system polarisation and, again, in theoretical terms, 
the more polarised the party system the less likely that a winning solution can be 
found
19
. In West European democracies we have seen an increase in the degree of 
fractionalisation of party systems since 1980 and the average West European 
parliament now contains seven political parties. However, a more nuanced measure of 
fractionalisation is a count of the number of ‘effective’ parties within a party system 
(defined as parties that can be expected to have an impact upon the outcome of a 
legislative ‘game’)20. And using this measure the average West European party 
system only contains four ‘effective’ parties21. 
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In practical terms, then, the average West European party system remains 
relatively stable and this stability is buttressed to a greater or lesser extent by nation-
specific system attributes such as voting rules (plurality versus proportional systems), 
barriers to representation (such as the five percent hurdle at the federal level in 
Germany), laws regulating internal party democracy, and so on. These institutional 
variables impose what theorists call a ‘structure induced equilibrium’22, the dynamics 
of which vary from country to country. 
Writing at around the same time as Shepsle, Gordon Smith
23
 highlighted the 
importance of system attributes, both as means of restraining party system 
fragmentation and also as means of imposing the structure induced equilibria, noted 
above, upon them. For Smith, the key system attribute is ‘cohesion’, a quality which, 
if present in sufficient quantities, will enhance system stability. There are two types of 
cohesion, both of which impact upon parties strategic considerations. The first, 
‘governing’ cohesion, determines the effectiveness of government in terms of its 
longevity, stability, and steering capacity. The second, ‘social’ cohesion, goes some 
way to determine the extent to which political parties are able effectively to integrate 
and aggregate competing societal interests and as a result satisfy voters’ preferences 
and shut out potential competitors. For Smith, the UK-style plurality system – 
designed to produce majoritarian single-party government - is the best suited to 
deliver both strong, stable government and an integrated electorate. Nevertheless, 
Smith also held the 1970s German party system in high regard in this respect, 
dominated as it was by two ‘balanced clusters’ of the SPD and FDP in coalition 
(which lasted from 1969-1982), balanced by the CDU/CSU in opposition
24
. It will be 
recalled from Table 1 that during the period when Smith was writing there were no 
flanking parties to either the left or right of the two Volksparteien. Between them the 
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liberal FDP maintained a pivotal position in what Pappi famously described as a 
‘triangular’ party system25.  
The ‘Pappi model’ of a triangular party system presented a particular set of 
incentives and constraints to the three parties in the German party system of the 
period. The traditional left-right dimension of competition remained important but in 
a relatively consensual party system the parties developed a modus operandi in which 
all three were able to cooperate with each other along one of three issue dimensions. 
This presented the players with three different solutions. First, as during the Grand 
Coalition of 1966-69, the SPD and CDU/CSU were able to co-operate along the 
corporatist dimension of the triangle. Second, as during the period 1969-82, the SPD 
and FDP could co-operate along the ‘social liberal’ dimension. Finally, as had been 
the case in the period up until 1966 and again from 1982-98, the CDU/CSU and FDP 
could co-operate along the dimension of ‘bourgeois issues’ such as economic growth 
and prosperity. Crucially, however, it was the ability of any of the three parties to 
either exit an existing coalition or enter a new coalition that instilled discipline and 
gave the Pappi model its consensual dynamic. This was particularly important to the 
FDP, whose raison d’etre in the absence of significant and socially grounded electoral 
support was to act as the ‘kingmaker’ or pivot party within the system. 
After 1983, however, the internal dynamics of the German party system began 
to change under the pressure of greater party system fragmentation and polarisation. 
Again, it will be recalled from Table 1 that 1983 and 1990 saw two critical junctures, 
in which the German party system fragmented, polarised, and skewed to the political 
left. The emergence of the Greens and then the PDS has turned the German party 
system into a genuinely multi-party system in which it is possible and even rational 
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for smaller parties such as themselves to seek out niche positions on the dominant 
left-right continuum and mobilise around more peripheral segments of what is 
normally a bell-curve of electoral preferences. In addition, as will be come apparent 
below, the new party system increasingly failed to function according to the 
consensual triangular dynamic of the past and now more strongly resembled a 
relatively polarised ‘two-bloc’ system, primarily but not exclusively based on the left 
right ideological dimension. The shape of the new party system is set out in Figure 1 
below. 
Figure 1 about here 
 
Figure 1 demonstrates a party system divided into two blocs along the left-right right 
ideological dimension, but also cross-cut by a libertarian-authoritarian dimension 
made salient by the emergence of post-materialism, noted earlier. In addition the 
Figure identifies three issue dimensions along which political parties might forge 
common policy positions. Of these three issue dimensions, the corporatist issue 
dimension remains from the old Pappi model. In 2005, this thus provided the potential 
for the formation of a Grand Coalition along the lines of 1966-69. However, the 
sublimation of the FDP into the bourgeois bloc over the previous 20 years effectively 
neutralized the old ‘social liberal’ issue dimension for the time being. This was 
confirmed by the FDP’s ruling out of the possibility of a coalition with the SPD 
before the federal election
26
. In its place, however, there was a possibility of co-
operation between the CDU and FDP along the bourgeois issue dimension or a 
continuation of co-operation along the ‘new politics’ dimension if the incumbent Red-
Green coalition was re-elected. 
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In 2005, therefore, the strategic environment described in Figure Two 
presented both the CDU/CSU and SPD with a strategic dilemma. On the one hand, as 
‘Catch-all’ parties they had no choice but to compete for the median voter by 
underplaying their ideological side and appealing to the centre of the bell-curve of 
voter preferences along the dominant left-right ideological dimension. On the other, 
the mathematics of coalition formation meant that unless they were to enter a Grand 
Coalition they more than likely had to rely on flanking parties to the left or right in 
order to form a government, which meant they also had to appeal in that direction. 
This dilemma has been particularly problematic for the SPD, which has had to cope 
with the emergence of two quite different competitors on its left flank. The emergence 
of the Greens, following the first critical juncture of 1983, presented the SPD with a 
particular set of problems as to how best to compete with a new party whose support 
was (i) mainly drawn from younger and/or well-educated voters, and which in 
ideological terms was (ii) to the left along the left-right ideological dimension and 
also (iii) more libertarian in outlook. This strategic problem was aggravated by the 
arrival of the PDS following the second juncture of 1990. Given the PDS’ position as 
the successor party to the ruling party of the German Democratic Republic, its 
emergence meant that the SPD now also had to compete with a party that (i) drew 
most of its support from a different social milieu to that of the Greens and was (ii) 
significantly to its left along the left-right ideological dimension but (iii) by 2005 had 
come to occupy roughly the same position along the libertarian-authoritarian 
dimension. 
To sum up therefore, the two Volksparteien have tried to prevent the 
emergence of parties on their political flanks. The CDU/CSU has been successful in 
this regard, whilst the SPD has had to compete with at first one and then two flanking 
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parties – albeit competing along different ideological dimensions. For smaller parties, 
the presence of the two big Volksparteien within the party system makes it rational for 
them to try and achieve a position where they hold the balance of power between the 
two Volksparteien, as the FDP managed to achieve up until 1983. However, in the 
2005 German party system such a pivotal position appeared beyond the reach of the 
FDP, Greens or PDS. 
One of the reasons why none of the smaller parties have managed to re-create 
the pivotal position enjoyed by the FDP before 1983 is that the increased level of 
fractionalisation within the party system means that the electoral arithmetic simply 
does not add up in the way that it did in the past. But once again we return to the issue 
of political agency – and in particular the relatively successful strategy by which the 
SPD has coped with the threat of the Greens and PDS. Much has been made in the 
past of the SPD’s strategic dilemma27. However, it has become apparent in recent 
years that the SPD has managed successfully to adapt to both these new electoral 
competitors, mainly because the bases of support for the two parties are territorially 
distinct. In 2005, the PDS continued to garner significant support in the new federal 
states but had conspicuously failed to make an impact in the old federal states. By 
contrast, the Greens’ initial respectable level of support had dissipated in most of the 
new federal states and it remained by-and-large a party of the affluent west. Because 
of this territorial distinctiveness the SPD has rarely been forced to compete with both 
parties simultaneously but rather has been able to develop different strategies of 
competition and cooperation - depending on in which part of the Federal Republic it is 
campaigning – and thus at the same time retain a reasonably credible policy mix. And 
in 2005, the SPD’s strategy appeared to have worked very well. In the new federal 
states, the PDS had lost support to the SPD in the 2002 Bundestag elections and failed 
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to scale the 5 per cent hurdle. As a result the PDS’ share of seats fell from 36 in the 
1998-2002 Bundestag to just two directly elected seats after the 2002 elections. And 
while the SPD had not managed to defeat the Greens in electoral terms, through a 
strategy of sustained co-operation it had managed to pull the party into its political 
orbit
28
. As a result the SPD and Greens had governed in a formal federal-level 
coalition since 1998, following over a decade of such coalitions at the Land level
29
. At 
the same time, the SPD had been able to cooperate with both the FDP and CDU at the 
Land level and hold out the possibility of similar arrangements at the federal level 
should the Red-Green coalition break down. These patterns of competition and co-
operation are discussed in greater depth in the next section. 
 
Patterns of Competition and Co-operation 
As noted earlier in this article, in 2005 the German party system displayed a strong 
territorial cleavage and a wider ideological range, within which the ideological centre 
of gravity has skewed leftwards. These changes had two main effects on the relative 
strengths of the parties. First, as discussed earlier, the emergence of a less fluid ‘two-
bloc’ system made it harder for any of the smaller parties to assume the pivotal 
position enjoyed by the FDP before 1983. It appears that this development has 
enhanced the relative dominance of the Volksparteien, although it will require one or 
two more Bundestag elections to be sure that this is the case
30
. Second, the skew 
towards the left has led to the SPD - rather than the FDP - increasingly being the party 
with the median legislator along the left-right continuum within the legislature. In 
theoretical terms, this makes the SPD the Mparty, without which no ideologically 
connected majority coalition can form and which should make it decisive in any 
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coalition game
31
. The shift of the median legislator from FDP to SPD is demonstrated 
in Table 2, below. 
Table 2 about here 
 
In addition to tracking the shift of Mparty from the FDP to the FDP, Table 2 
demonstrates two other points. The first, relatively self-evident, point is that – in 
keeping with the theoretical predictions noted above – throughout the run of data the 
Mparty always becomes a member of the winning coalition. The second, more 
significant, observation is that not only did the SPD become Mparty after the 1998 
elections; the outcomes of the 1998 and 2002 coalition negotiations also made it 
MpartyK. The term MpartyK refers to a given political party that not only ‘owns’ the 
median legislator within the legislature but also the median legislator within the 
winning coalition. In real world coalition outcomes, the position of the median 
legislator and the median legislatorK are often different and it would be expected that 
ceteris paribus subsequent coalition policy positions would fall within the interstices 
of the preference curves of the median legislator and median legislatorK
32
. The 
important thing to remember, however, is that any political party which is both 
Mparty and MpartyK is doubly decisive within the coalition game, in that (i) it should 
be in all majority ideologically connected coalitions and (ii) subsequent policy 
outcomes should be close to its ideal position. Because of its size and the ideological 
range of the coalitions in which it took part, the position of MpartyK was something 
the FDP was never able to achieve. 
Thus, the SPD as Mparty and MpartyK would be expected to enjoy a degree 
of political leverage within the winning coalition greater than that expected from its 
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relative size. And on the basis of what we know of the 1998-2005 Red-Green 
coalition, this was the case
33
. Despite effectively saving the ruling coalition in the 
2002 federal election through its better than expected electoral performance, the 
Greens never enjoyed the kind of influence enjoyed by the FDP in previous 
coalitions
34
. Indeed, with the exception of the Foreign Ministry (which under normal 
circumstances is always allocated to the junior coalition party in Germany) the Greens 
singularly failed to secure any blue-chip portfolios in either 1998 or 2002
35
. This 
compares badly with the range of portfolios secured by the FDP in previous 
coalitions. 
Thus we can observe a new two-block party system at the federal level. But 
what was the picture at the Land level? The pattern of party political competition in 
Land parliaments as of 1
st
 September 2005 is set out in Table 3, below.  
Table 3 about here 
 
Taken in the round, in Table 3 there were a total of eight different parties in the 
various Land legislatures, ranging from the PDS on the left of the party system to the 
DVU on the right
36
. But, of these eight parties only the CDU and SPD were present in 
all 16 Land parliaments; thus confirming the relative dominance of the two 
Volksparteien
37
. Table 3 also demonstrates the clear territorial cleavage noted earlier. 
Thus we find that there were both ‘type 1’ and ‘type 2’ party systems at the Land 
level
38
. In the old federal states we find type 1 systems, made up of the Greens, SPD, 
FDP, and CDU or CSU. In 2005 such systems existed in Baden-Württemberg, Hesse, 
Lower Saxony, North Rhine Westphalia, Rhineland Palatinate, Saarland, and 
Schleswig-Holstein. There were also variants of the type 1 system in Bremen and 
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Bavaria (where the FDP was excluded), and Hamburg (which also included the PRO, 
the ex-Schill party). Type 2 systems, although made up of three parties (the PDS, 
SPD, and CDU) lacked the triangular dynamic of the old Pappi model found in West 
Germany in the 1960s and 1970s, and in 2005 were found in Mecklenburg-West 
Pomerania and Thuringia. There were also two variants, to be found in Brandenburg 
(which also included the far-right DVU) and Saxony-Anhalt (which included the 
FDP). Very interestingly, we find two instances of the development of what might be 
called a ‘Type 3’ system which encompasses all of the parties found in the ‘national’ 
system. Thus, in Berlin there was a hybrid system - made up of a type 1 sub-system in 
the old West Berlin and a type 2 sub-system in that part of the city that used to be part 
of the German Democratic Republic – and in Saxony there was a party system that 
included the PDS, Greens, SPD, FDP, CDU and far-right NPD. The Berlin and 
Saxony party systems also encapsulated the other two phenomena discussed earlier, 
namely higher levels of party system fractionalisation and a greater ideological range 
within the system. Saxony in particular displayed a significant level of 
fractionalisation and had the largest ideological range of any of the Land party 
systems. 
 
Conclusions 
So what do the arguments and data discussed in this article demonstrate? In many 
ways, the picture that emerges is confusing and potentially contradictory. On the one 
hand, we find higher levels of party system fractionalisation than was the case in the 
1950s, 60s, and 70s. At first glance, such party system deconcentration should work 
against the interests of the two big Volksparteien. Indeed, in the 1980s and early 
1990s, the SPD did struggle to adjust to the presence of first one and then two 
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competitors on the left of the party system. For its part, however, the CDU/CSU has 
managed to prevent the emergence of a sustained challenge on its right flank and thus 
avoided the strategic difficulties encountered by the SPD. 
This article has argued, however, that a closer analysis of party system change 
in Germany reveals that the strategic environment has actually become more benign 
for the Volksparteien and in particular the SPD. There are four main reasons for this. 
First, the degree of fractionalisation that has taken place has served to make it more 
difficult for a single small party to assume the ‘kingmaker’ or ‘pivot’ role enjoyed by 
the FDP in the old triangular system. Second, the loss of the kingmaker has both 
enhanced - and been enhanced by - the emergence of a two-bloc dynamic, in which 
one of the two Volksparteien almost inevitably dominate each bloc. Third, the 
emergence and persistence of the new territorial cleavage in the united Germany 
means that the SPD has managed to forge a modus operandi that allows for 
competition and/or co-operation with the Greens and PDS in territorially discreet 
arenas. This has served to offset the problem generated by the need to compete and 
co-operate with the two parties along distinct ideological and issue dimensions and 
has helped the SPD maintain a reasonably credible policy mix. Finally, the skew in 
the party system to the left has shifted the position of the median legislator to the 
SPD’s advantage, to the extent that in the 1998 and 2002 federal elections it was not 
only Mparty but also MpartyK. As discussed, in theoretical terms this makes the SPD 
decisive in any coalition game that requires an ideologically connected majority 
outcome. 
So where did that leave the political parties at the start of the final weeks of 
campaigning in September 2005? We now know the outcome of the federal election 
and this is dealt with elsewhere in the volume. What we can say here is that the 
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arguments made in this article indicate that the formation of a Grand Coalition at the 
end of 2005 was not inevitable but - I would argue – was more likely than was 
perhaps recognised at the time
39
. And despite the electoral strength of the FDP, the 
party system dynamics described in this article were to play their part in consigning 
them once again to the opposition benches. Thus, although voters did punish the 
outgoing Red-Green coalition, it was the Greens that bore the brunt of public anger. 
Moreover, the expected challenge from the PDS/Party of the Left was not sufficient to 
make them serious players in the post-election coalition negotiations
40
. For their part, 
the SPD were to remain in power and – as junior partner to the CDU/CSU - continue 
to play a potentially decisive role in the government of the Federal Republic. In short, 
the outcome of the 2005 federal election was very much in keeping with what this 
article argues has taken place – namely a return to Volkspartei dominance. 
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Table 1. The Development of the German party system. Federal Elections: 1949-
2002. 
  49 53 57 61 65 69 72 76 80 83 87 90 94 98 02 
 KPD                
L PDS                
 
Green                
SPD                
FDP                
CDU/CSU                
DP                
BHE                
DZ                
DRP                
WAV                
BP                
R SSW                
           Ju
n
ctu
re 1
 
 J
u
n
ctu
re 2
 
   
Source: Lees, 2005: 131. 
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Figure 1. The Strategic Environment in the 2005 German Party System 
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of manifestos. 
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Table 2.  Bundestag Elections 1983-2002.  Mparties and Coalition Outcomes. 
Date of Bundestag Election 
 06/03/83 25/01/87 02/12/90 16/10/94 27/09/98 22/09/02 
Seats in Bundestag 
CDU/CSU 244 223 319 294 245 248 
FDP 34 46 79 47 44 47 
SPD 193 186 239 252 298 251 
Greens 27 42 8 49 47 55 
PDS --- --- 17 30 35 02 
Total Seats 498 497 662 672 669 603 
Minimum Winner 250 249 332 337 335 302 
Mparty FDP FDP FDP FDP SPD SPD 
MpartyK?  No No No No Yes Yes 
Coalition  CDU/CSU-
FDP 
CDU/CSU-
FDP 
CDU/CSU-
FDP 
CDU/CSU-
FDP 
SPD-Greens SPD-Greens 
Degree of Change None None None None Total None 
Source: Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, 1983, 1987, 1990, 1994, 1998, 2002. 
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Table 3. Party systems in the German Länder Parliaments as of 1 September 2005 
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Normal Term/ 
Next 
Election 
Baden- 
Wűrttemberg 
          5 years/ 
Spring 2006 
Bavaria           5 years/ 
Autumn 2008 
Berlin           5 years/ 
Autumn 2006 
Brandenburg           5 years/ 
Autumn 2009 
Bremen/ 
Bremerhaven 
          4 years/ 
Spring 2007 
Hamburg           4 years/ 
Autumn 2005 
Hesse           5 years/ 
Spring 2008 
Lower Saxony           5 years/ 
Spring 2008 
Mecklenburg-West 
Pomerania 
          4 years/ 
Autumn 2006 
North Rhine-
Westphalia 
          5 years/ 
Spring 2010 
Rhineland Palatinate           5 years/ 
Spring 2006 
Thuringia           5 years/ 
Autumn 2009 
Saarland           5 years/ 
Autumn 2009 
Saxony           5 years/ 
Autumn. 2009 
Saxony- 
Anhalt 
          5 years/ 
Autumn 2006 
Schleswig-Holstein           5 years/ 
Spring 2010 
Source: Deutscher Bundestag (htttp://www.bundestag.de/info/wahlen/152.html); Land websites. 
Notes: Table refers to party Fraktionen only. * ‘Other’ refers to local/particularist parties.  At present there 
is one such party in a Land legislature: the South Sűdschleswigsche Wählerverband (see end note 3). 
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